Open inbound ports
RDP on 3389, a NAS admin page, a camera NVR, a line-of-business app on a nonstandard port. Scanned continuously, brute-forced routinely.
Every port you forward is a door with a sign on it. Private cloud routing replaces that model: a lightweight connector inside your network makes an outbound-only connection to Cloudflare, and authorized users and sites reach your servers through it. Nothing is listening on a public IP, because nothing needs to be.
Almost every network we inherit has at least one of these. They work. They also mean the internet can reach your server, and the only thing between the two is a password and hope.
RDP on 3389, a NAS admin page, a camera NVR, a line-of-business app on a nonstandard port. Scanned continuously, brute-forced routinely.
Once a user is on, they're on the network — every subnet, every share, every device. A stolen credential inherits the whole thing.
A public listener that has to be patched promptly and sized for peak load, and that becomes a headline every time a CVE lands.
A machine-tool vendor, an ERP consultant, and a former contractor with a static-IP allow rule that's been in the firewall since 2021.
Both offices are 192.168.1.0/24 and nothing routes cleanly between them.
Two firewalls arguing over an IPsec tunnel that fails during business hours and comes back before anyone can look at it.
A connector daemon (cloudflared) runs inside your
network — on a VM, a server, or a container — and dials out to the Cloudflare edge over an
encrypted connection. Traffic for your internal resources travels back down that
connection. Your firewall keeps zero inbound rules for it.
cloudflared establishes the connection outward. No public IP, no NAT rule, no listener to attack. Deployed with multiple replicas so a single host reboot is not an outage.
Internal CIDR ranges published into Cloudflare, so client devices can reach IPs and internal hostnames as though they were on the LAN — without being on the LAN.
Overlapping RFC1918 ranges handled properly. Two sites both running 192.168.1.0/24 stop being an architectural problem.
An internal web app published at a real hostname, with a Cloudflare-managed certificate and an Access policy in front — no DMZ, no reverse proxy to maintain, no origin exposure.
Who the user is (Entra ID, Okta, Google Workspace group membership) and what they're connecting from (OS version, disk encryption, managed-device check) both factor into whether the connection is permitted.
Scripts, CI jobs, and vendor integrations get scoped, revocable credentials instead of a permanent firewall exception.
Administrative access to a server through a browser session, logged, with no client software and no exposed port. Plan-dependent — see the limitations below.
Where the requirement is genuinely network-to-network rather than user-to-resource, we scope Magic WAN instead of stacking tunnels. Separate scope; we'll say so up front.
Inbound rules for remote access come out. Fewer moving parts, less to review, less to get wrong at 4 p.m. on a Friday.
A user is authorized for the ERP server, not for "the network." Revoking access is a policy change, not a firewall change.
Every session is attributable to a person or a token, with a timestamp. Useful during an incident, and useful on an insurance questionnaire.
WARP client + private network routes
Replaces flat VPN with per-resource authorization
Tunnel + Access policy, optionally browser-rendered
Closes 3389/22 permanently
Public hostname via tunnel + Access
No DMZ, no exposed origin, real certificate
Tunnel route + service token or scoped policy
Narrow, logged, revocable, time-boxed
Virtual networks
Resolves the IP collision without re-addressing
Connector on a segmented VLAN
Reachable by the people who need it, invisible to everyone else
What's currently reachable from the internet, what the VPN grants, which vendors have standing access, and where the addressing problems are. Written findings and a migration plan. Stands alone as a deliverable.
Redundant connectors, routes, virtual networks, identity integration, policy set, pilot, cutover, and decommissioning of the old inbound rules. Documented and handed over.
Connector health and patching, policy and route changes, new-hire and vendor provisioning, session log review, and quarterly access review. Billed monthly.
Stand up cloudflared with two replicas, publish a single non-critical internal app, and prove the path end to end. Existing VPN stays up untouched.
Publish the internal CIDRs, wire up the identity provider, set group-based policies, and move a pilot group of real users off the VPN. This is where we find the app that expects a specific source IP.
Move remaining users, migrate admin access, then decommission inbound firewall rules and the VPN concentrator — in that order, and not before. Closing the ports is the last step, because it's the one that's inconvenient to undo in a hurry.
Closing the old inbound rules is the point of the project. A deployment that leaves the VPN and the port forwards running alongside the tunnel has added a system without removing a risk. We'll push on this.
This is the single highest-value change available to most small networks.
Outgrowing a VPN that grants everything to everyone.
With routing and addressing problems that re-addressing alone will not fix.
With equipment and vendors that need narrow, logged access.
That have to answer "who reached that system, and when" with a record.
Or on the wrong side of a recent CVE.
cloudflared runs on a host that needs patching, monitoring, and enough resources. We deploy redundant replicas and monitor them; a single-replica install on a workstation under someone’s desk is not a design.
Traffic routes through the Cloudflare edge. For most business applications the difference isn't noticeable; for moving very large datasets between sites all day, it is. That's a Magic WAN or dedicated-circuit conversation.
UDP and ICMP support over private routes has real constraints, and some industrial and legacy protocols assume LAN latency. We test the specific application rather than assuming.
It solves the collision; it doesn't make the topology simpler. Documentation matters more here.
Browser-rendered SSH/RDP, seat counts, and certain policy features vary by Cloudflare tier. We'll tell you which tier your requirements actually need before you buy one.
Some line-of-business apps and licence servers make decisions based on the client address. Those get identified in the pilot phase, and occasionally need a vendor conversation.
An authorized user on a compromised laptop still reaches what they are authorized for. Pair it with Endpoint Security.
If the server is down, a tunnel to it is also down. See Backup & Disaster Recovery.
Related: Endpoint Security · Backup & Disaster Recovery
For most user-to-resource access, yes — that's usually the goal. We keep the VPN running in parallel through the pilot phase and decommission it once the tunnel is carrying real work.
No inbound ones. The connector needs outbound access to the Cloudflare edge, which most firewalls already permit.
Nothing, if it's deployed properly. We run multiple replicas across separate hosts so a reboot or a failed VM doesn't take access with it.
Often, yes — an internal app published at a hostname with an Access policy needs only a browser and an email-based login. Full private-network access does require the client.
Rarely, for normal application traffic — sessions are handled at the Cloudflare edge nearest the user rather than backhauled to your office. Bulk file transfer over a slow office upload link is still bounded by that upload link.
Yes. Internal DNS resolution is configured as part of the deployment so private hostnames keep working for users on the client.
No. Virtual networks let both ranges coexist without re-addressing either office.
They're two halves of one platform. Zero Trust Access is the authorization layer — who gets in. Private cloud routing is the transport layer — how the traffic gets there without an open port. We usually deploy them together.
On that last one, see Zero Trust Access (ZTNA) — the authorization half of the same platform.
The authorization layer that sits in front of these routes.
The full Cloudflare One platform this belongs to.
The outbound half — same client, same policy engine.
For the resources you do publish publicly.
The device this can't vouch for.
The segmentation and edge this rides on rather than replaces.
Humans reviewing the session and access logs.
Send us a short note about your environment. We'll walk your remote access setup, tell you which ports can be closed and in what order, and be straight with you about anything that genuinely still needs a VPN.
Trusted by dozens of businesses